Showing posts with label industrialized building. Show all posts
Showing posts with label industrialized building. Show all posts

Thursday 22 September 2022

Comparisons of Construction to Manufacturing Use Flawed Data

 


Construction productivity has been negatively compared with manufacturing (e.g. McKinsey), and the comparisons are typically between all of construction and all of manufacturing. The problem is that both are averages of extremely varied economic activities of firms, based on data collected by the standard industrial classification (SIC) system. This makes useful comparisons between the two difficult, as this post using UK data argues. The post first breaks down industry statistics on UK construction and manufacturing to show the structural differences, and then compares construction to the car industry, showing a comparison between the two requires including repair and maintenance with vehicle manufacture. Lessons from other industries and their production methods and processes can be useful and informative, however, comparing performance between industries is very difficult without adjustments to make the subjects comparable.

 

The production of building elements and components somewhere other than the construction site has been variously called prefabrication, pre-cast and pre-assembly construction, and offsite manufacturing (OSM). The degree of OSM and preassembly varies from basic sub-assemblies to entire modules, and the use of OSM varies greatly from country to country. Types of offsite construction are panelised systems, volumetric systems with partial assembly of rooms, units or pods offsite, and factory built modular components or homes. Offsite manufacture is used to describe factory production and preassembly of components, elements or modules. Prefabrication is used to describe offsite production of components that are installed onsite. The idea that OSM and prefabrication are the solution to problems of poor quality and low productivity in construction became central to the movement to ‘reform’ construction by making it more like manufacturing.

 

Advocates of industrialized building argued for construction to adopt similar production practices to manufacturing, particularly car manufacturing. However, while there are some factory made buildings, the number and type of standardized buildings is limited, whereas opportunities for producers of standardized construction products are widespread. Onsite production is organized around those standard parts and materials but manufacturing, in contrast, is organized around standardised products and continuous production runs. 

 

In UK construction the largest grouping by number of enterprises and employment is specialised construction, typically single trade contractors (there are 17 individual industries or trades under SIC 43). The largest group by turnover is building contractors, including residential and non-residential building with only two SIC sub-categories. Civil engineering contractors have the smallest number of enterprises and employment but the highest average number of employees and highest average turnover per enterprise. Civil engineering work is typically of larger scale compared to building work.

 


Table 1. UK Construction turnover 2019



Source:  Meikle, J. and de Valence, G. 2022. Construction products and producers: One industry or three, in Best, R. and Meikle, J. (eds.) Describing Construction: Industries, projects and firms, London: Taylor and Francis. Data from ONS Annual Business Survey 2018.

 


Data on construction turnover by size of firm includes the value of subcontracting and construction work by non-contractors. The distribution of construction turnover by number and size of firm and average turnover per firm is: 99% of construction firms have less than 50 employees and are responsible for just over 50% of turnover; and 94% of firms have less than 10 employees and are responsible for around 35% of turnover. At the other end of the size scale, less than 1% of firms, those with 50 or more employees, are responsible for the other 50% of turnover. Around 0.1%, a few hundred, are responsible for around 30% of turnover and each of these has an annual turnover averaging around £275 million. The structure of the construction typically takes this form.   


 

Table 2. Construction firms by employment 2019


Source:  Meikle, J. and de Valence, G. 2022. Construction products and producers: One industry or three, in Best, R. and Meikle, J. (eds.) Describing Construction: Industries, projects and firms, London: Taylor and Francis. Data from ONS Annual Business Survey 2018.


 

Although the SIC groups all construction firms into a single category, that is for statistical convenience based on conventions developed originally for classifying manufacturing. The exclusion of design from construction output while included in manufacturing and the inclusion of R&M in construction but not in manufacturing is one result.[i] Another is the view of construction as a single industry, producing and maintaining buildings and structures, despite their many different types and the differences in the producers and processes used in their delivery. 

 

Manufacturing in the UK comprises 24 two-digit industrial groups (SIC 10 to SIC 33), for example, food products (SIC 10), manufacture of paper and paper products (SIC 17) and manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (SIC 29); and 325 individual industries.  Manufacturing of fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment (SIC 25) is the largest two-digit group with 22 individual industries, 26,301 total group enterprises and total group turnover of  £23.6 billion; the smallest is the single industry group of manufacture of tobacco products (SIC 12) with nine enterprises and a turnover of £12 million.  Manufacturing is not only relatively large but extremely diverse and industry policies have reflected that by targeting specific industries such as IT and automobiles for example.

 

The table below shows that total UK Construction turnover is less than 50% of Manufacturing turnover, although it is much larger than any individual manufacturing industry.  Manufacturing has 21% of firms that are small and medium size, construction has 6%, and manufacturing turnover is more concentrated in the larger firms.

 

 

Table 3. UK construction and manufacturing compared by size of firm


Source: Meikle, J. and de Valence, G. 2022. Construction products and producers: One industry or three, in Best, R. and Meikle, J. (eds.) Describing Construction: Industries, projects and firms, London: Taylor and Francis. Data from ONS Annual Business Survey 2018.

 


The largest UK manufacturing industry in 2018 was motor vehicles, with 22% of construction turnover and 5.5% of construction employment, and it is manufacture of motor vehicles that is often compared with construction and used as the example to be followed in OSM. Based on turnover per employee (an imperfect but indicative measure of productivity), vehicle manufacturing (&07,965) is over three times as productive as construction (197,902). This might be the case, or it may be a statistical illusion, created by the framework of the SIC.

 

 

Table 4. Comparing UK construction and vehicle manufacture 2018


Source: Meikle, J. and de Valence, G. 2022. Construction products and producers: One industry or three, in Best, R. and Meikle, J. (eds.) Describing Construction: Industries, projects and firms, London: Taylor and Francis. Data from ONS Annual Business Survey 2018.

 

 

Table 5 breaks down construction to its main components and adjusts manufacturing by including both the manufacture and repair and the maintenance of motor vehicles.  All construction includes both new construction and the repair and maintenance of existing buildings and works. The manufacture of motor vehicles does not. In order to adjust for this, maintenance of vehicles (SIC 45.2) should be added to manufacture of vehicles (SIC 29.1) to make the groups more comparable. When vehicle maintenance is added to manufacture, turnover increases by 58% but employment increases by almost 180%.  

 

This allows a more realistic comparison and reveals that motor vehicles and their maintenance (SIC 29.1 plus SIC  45.2) has almost the same turnover per worker  (1.6mn) as building construction (1.4mn), twice that of specialist construction (0.9mn) but less than engineering construction (2.1mn).  Turnover per worker is a metric of productivity and, on this basis, all construction is less productive than all manufacturing and much less productive than motor vehicle production. However, when repair is added to manufacture, the car industry is on a par with building, the largest part of construction. 

 

 

Table 5. Turnover and employment by SIC division 2018


Source:  Meikle, J. and de Valence, G. 2022. Construction products and producers: One industry or three, in Best, R. and Meikle, J. (eds.) Describing Construction: Industries, projects and firms, London: Taylor and Francis. Data from ONS Annual Business Survey 2018.


 

With the differences in these industries in terms of firm size, turnover and employment, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from a comparison of their structure, economic performance or productivity. Vehicle manufacture and, to a lesser extent vehicle repair and maintenance, are capital intensive businesses. Construction, generally, is not, although a few activities like tunnelling and prefabricated housing are. Comparisons between manufacturing and construction based on the figures from the SIC are not helpful or accurate without adjustment.   

 

Nevertheless, on the basis of these comparisons, for the last three decades advocates for applying production methods from car manufacturing to offsite manufacturing in construction have argued this is necessary to improve construction productivity and products. Despite the distinctly different characteristics of manufacturing and construction there have been and are many attempts to industrialize construction. However, after decades of efforts to promote OSM, the market share of OSM remains small, estimates are low single digits of total construction work in the UK, US and Australia. Success elsewhere is restricted to specific markets such as fast food outlets and hotels, or house manufacturers like the Japanese and Scandinavian firms Sekisui and Ikea. 

 

The US and UK governments have both supported OSM, with the UK government funding research, publishing case studies and promoting OSM in construction for decades.[i] In the US a Technology Roadmap for Advanced panelised construction was produced in 2003 for the Department of Housing and Urban Development as a Partnership for Advanced Technology in Housing (PATH[ii]). Despite these efforts, offsite production is not industry practice in either country. Although pre-cast concrete and panelised construction are widely used, OSM has not led to significant advances in mechanization or required a thorough reorganization of project management methods.  

 

OSM markets exist mainly in housing and institutional building, wherever it is the most effective or efficient piece of technology available and there is a lot of repetition from project to project. This manufacturing-centric view of progress in construction, endorsed by numerous government and industry reports, was the end point of the development trajectory from the first to the third industrial revolutions. Despite all efforts this has not become the primary system of construction of the built environment because OSM does not deliver a decisive advantage over onsite production for the great majority of projects. Instead, construction has a deep, diverse and specialised value chain that resists integration because it is flexible and adapted to economic variability.




[i] Farmer, M. 2016. Modernise or die, London: Construction Leadership Council.

[ii] PATH, 2004. Technology Roadmap: Advanced panelised construction, 2003 Progress Report. Partnership for Advanced Technology in Housing (PATH), Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Washington, D.C.

[i] Despite the importance of repair and maintenance, only Canada has an annual business capital and repair expenditures survey. Between 2006 and 2016 construction R&M by firms averaged nine percent of their total capital expenditure, or around 1.2 percent of GDP, ranging between one percent of GDP in 2006 and 1.3 percent in 2012. Statistics Canada. Table: 34-10-0035-01 Capital and repair expenditures, non-residential tangible assets


Saturday 14 August 2021

Industrialized Building and the Failure of Katerra

Why Modern Methods of Construction Don't Work


Offsite manufacturing, modular and prefabricated building have been transforming construction like nuclear fusion has been transforming energy: they have both been twenty years away from working at scale for the last 60 years. These ‘modern methods of construction’ have a dismal track record. The brutal economies of scale and scope in a project-based, geographically dispersed industry subject to extreme swings in demand have always bought previous periods of their growth and development to an end. 

 

While the history of prefabrication features major projects like the Great Exhibition in 1855 and more recently the Oresund Bridge in 2000, the reality is that prefabrication has only been successful in specific niche markets such as institutional buildings, or house manufacturers like the Japanese and Scandinavian firms Sekisui and Ikea. Failures like Katerra in mid-2021 and the mail order houses sold by Sears Roebuck a hundred years ago in the US are common. In the UK 2017 Industrial Strategy Construction was one of the four Sector Deals along with AI, the car industry and life sciences, with the aim to change the way buildings are created with a manufacturing hub for offsite and modular construction. By 2021 the focus had moved on, to the energy efficiency of buildings and new design standards. 

 

The up-front capital requirements of prefabrication make it a capital-intensive form of production, which brings high fixed costs in a cyclic industry characterised by demand volatility over the cycle. This means macroeconomic events often determine the success or failure of the underpinning business model and the success or the eventual failure of the investment. A batch of new US prefab housing firms failed during the GFC after 2007, for example, demonstrating the importance of the relationship between economic and business conditions and the viability of the business model for industrialised building.

 

Manufactured housing in the US also provides an insight into the institutional barriers to industrialisation in construction that exist in many countries and cities. Although the Department of Housing and Urban Development hasa national code, US cities discriminate against manufactured housing as local and county governments use a variety of land use planning devices to restrict or ban their use, and often place them in locations far from amenities such as schools, transportation, doctors and jobs. Despite these barriers, in 2021 there were 33 firms with 136 factories that produced nearly 95,000 homes. 

 

An ambitious attempt at offsite manufacturing (OSM) and industrialized building was made by Katerra, a US firm that was reinventing construction but has now gone into receivership. The manufacture of building elements and components somewhere other than the construction site has been variously called prefabrication, pre-cast and pre-assembly construction. Types of offsite construction are panelised systems erected onsite, volumetric systems that involve partial assembly of units or pods offsite, and factory built modular components or pods. The degree of OSM and preassembly varies from basic sub-assemblies to entire modules. Katerra manufactured prefabricated cross laminated timber (CLT) structures.  

 

 

Katerra

 

Katerra was a Californian start-up, founded in 2015. In 2017 it reached a $1 billion valuation, The company’s goal was complete vertical integration of design and construction, from concept sketches of a building to installing CLT panels and the bolting it together. On their projects the company wanted to be architect, offsite manufacturer and onsite contractor. This led to issues with the developers and contractors the company dealt with most of whom, it turned out, didn’t want the complete end-to-end service Katerra offered. 

 

The company started by developing software to manage an extensive supply chain for fixtures and fittings from around the world, but particularly China, and then added a US factory making roof trusses, cabinets, wall panels, and other elements. In 2016 the business model changed because architects weren’t specifying Katerra’s products. Katerra would design its own buildings and specify its own products. In 2017 it built a CLT factory that increased US output by 50 percent. The factory shut in 2019. Dissatisfied with design software that didn’t meet its needs, it developed a custom suite called Apollo. This was to be a platform for project development and delivery, well beyond the document control and communication of then available software from Oracle Aconex, Trimble Connect, Procore and SAP Connect. Apollo integrated six functions: 

1.      Report: use an address to find site information, zoning, and crime rates etc.; 

2.      Insight: design with the two building platforms; 

3.      Direct: a library of components used in the building; 

4.      Compose: for coordination between the different groups working on a project;

5.      Construct: for construction management (similar to Procore and Bluebeam):

6.      Connect: for managing the workforce on a project, with a database of subcontractors.

 

One of the company’s three founders was a property developer, and his projects provided the initial pipeline of work that made the company viable. Initially, buildings were designed by outside architects, but in 2016 the company started a design division. A second founder had a tech venture capital fund, the third and CEO did a stint at Tesla. Their ambition was to leverage new technologies to transform building by linking design and production through software, designing buildings in Revit and converting the files to a different format for machines in the factory. 

 

In 2018, after raising $865 million in venture capital led by SoftBank’s Vision Fund, Katerra acquired Michael Green Architecture, a leading advocate of CLT, and over a dozen other architects and contractors. In 2020 the business model changed again, by taking equity stakes in developments to boost demand. Katerra struggled to complete the projects. Accumulating losses and cost overruns during the Covid pandemic overwhelmed the company and in June 2021 Katerra Construction filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 

 

In six years Katerra had grown to a 7,500 person company. That growth cost both money and focus, of the total US$2.2bn raised, SoftBank invested $2bn between 2018 and 2020. Without a clear focus, Katerra didn’t have a target customer base and got distracted by software and developing internet-of-things technology. The executive team was dominated by industry outsiders, but Katerra hired architects and engineers from traditional firms. Tension was inevitable. The fatal problem was execution, Katerra didn’t vertically integrate acquisitions into a company that did everything. It was fragmented and didn’t have a product platform or Apollo ready in time.   

 

With Apollo, Katerra was actually behind other companies developing platforms that manage design and construction in various ways. These platforms are at the technological frontier, a fourth industrial revolution technology for OSM with automated production of components. Other firms have developed different approaches to digital manufacturing and restructuring of firm boundaries to Katerra, integrating design and construction through development of digital platforms that provide design, component specification and manufacturing, delivery and on-site assembly. 

 

For example, in 2018 Project Frog released KitConnect, bringing together a decade of development into prefabrication and component design, and integrating BIM with DfMa and logistics. US start-ups in the wake of Katerra like Junoand Generate also don’t build factories but outsource assembly. Outfit offers homeowners a DIY renovation from its website, then orders and ships the materials and provides step-by-step instructions for completing the work (the Sears model again). Also in 2021, the IPO for PM software company Procore raised $635 at a valuation near $10bn, a record for construction tech. Rival Aconex was bought by Oracle in 2017 for $1.2bn. Platforms are in the process of becoming a basic part of construction tech. In the UK Pagabo launched a procurement platform in 2021, mainly for the public sector, using framework agreements for building work valued between £250k to £10m. Australian 2021 procurement IPO Felix had local start-ups Buildxact, SiteMate, Mastt, Portt and VenderPanel with competing platforms.  

 

 

Conclusion

 

The idea of construction as production was based on OSM, but after decades of development has yet to become a viable business model. There have been successes in manufactured housing, but often macroeconomic factors undermined their viability. Niche markets exist in institutional building, or wherever it is the most effective or efficient piece of technology available. This manufacturing-centric view of progress in construction, endorsed by numerous government and industry reports, is the end point of the development trajectory from the first to the third industrial revolutions.

 

The technological base of OSM is a mix of those from the first industrial revolution, like concrete, with second and third revolution technologies like factories and lean production. Despite all efforts this has not become a system of production because OSM does not deliver a decisive advantage over onsite production for the great majority of projects. Instead, construction has a deep, diverse and specialised value chain that resists integration because it is flexible and adapted to economic variability. Policy makers may neither like nor appreciate this brute fact, but economies of scale are the economic equivalent of gravity and OSM has not delivered. 


The constraints of OSM have outweighed the drivers and benefits. At this stage the market share of OSM remains small and niche, estimates are low single digits of total construction work in the UK, US and Australia. Success elsewhere is restricted to a few specific markets and project types. The problem is not the technology, which can be made to work, but the expected economies of scale are difficult to achieve because of a range of factors. Some of these factors are internal to construction, but others are external. In particular, macroeconomic events like financial crises or energy and commodity price changes can quickly undermine a business model. 


Norman Foster said in an interview ‘A building is only as good as its client’. With industrialized building the client is the producer, which is not necessarily a bad thing, however this has restricted its use to niche markets. How to apply the technologies of the fourth industrial revolution so they work with the economies of scale for onsite production in construction, beyond the OSM paradigm that has been followed for years without success, is the challenge